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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 09-4237 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL REIS, SR.; LAWRENCE J. KATZ, on their own behalf;  
and as assignees of Weaver Nut Company, Inc., 
                                  Appellants 
 
v. 
 
BARLEY, SNYDER, SENFT & COHEN, LLC 
        ____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 05-01651) 
District Judge:  Honorable James Knoll Gardner 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  February 11, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 The District Court granted in part and denied in part defendant‟s motion to 
dismiss. After a bench trial of thirty-five days, the Court entered judgment in favor of 
 2 
defendant on the remaining claims. Plaintiffs appeal the Court‟s decisions. We will affirm 
in part and reverse and remand in part. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1
 
Weaver Nut Company (“Weaver Nut”) distributes candy, nuts, and dried fruit. Ten 
years ago, E. Paul Weaver, III (“Weaver”), and Miriam Weaver, his wife (collectively the 
“Weavers”), owned Weaver Nut, but the company was in financial straits. For “many 
years” under Weaver‟s leadership, Weaver Nut “engaged in practices including below 
cost sales to customers, purchasing without regard to existing inventory and anticipated 
demand and sale of „out of date‟ product.” (R. at 58.) In the spring of 2001, Michael Reis, 
Sr. (“Reis”), learned about Weaver Nut‟s situation and told Lawrence Katz about it. Katz 
does business as the Summit Private Capital Group (“Summit”), and Katz proposed to 
Weaver that Weaver Nut and Summit enter into a Merchant Banking and Corporate 
Development Agreement (“Agreement”). The Agreement was executed by Weaver and 
Katz in the summer of 2001. Under its terms, Reis became the CFO of Weaver Nut; Reis, 
Katz, and Weaver received compensation; and Summit was entitled to certain payments, 
including a commission on the financing deals it arranged. By virtue of an option in the 
Agreement, Reis and Katz became shareholders in Weaver Nut, and by the end of 2001, 
they collectively owned one half of the company, and the Weavers owned the other half.  
                                                 
1
 The differences between the facts alleged in the amended complaint and the facts 
that the District Court found after trial are not material to our resolution of this appeal. 
We will, therefore, summarize the facts as found by the Court.   
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Reis began working at Weaver Nut in September of 2001 and was on site for 
approximately two weeks out of each month. He “was responsible for the day-to-day 
operations.” (Id.) Katz, on the other hand, visited “every couple of months, or 
approximately six to eight times” during his involvement with the company. (Id. at 57.) 
During the period between late 2001 and early 2003, Katz “worked behind the scenes” to 
find business partners or acquisitions for Weaver Nut. (Id. at 58.) Reis and Katz helped 
Weaver Nut obtain a non-traditional line of credit that was “very time consuming and 
cumbersome,” as well as “more expensive for the company than traditional bank 
financing.” (Id. at 57.) Reis hired new employees, including more salespeople. Weaver 
Nut also put into place an inventory-control policy that required two signatures for every 
purchase order (“two-signature policy”), and although Weaver initially approved the 
policy, he later claimed that he did not and refused to follow it. Tensions between Weaver 
and Reis boiled over regarding the two-signature policy, and they sent contradictory 
letters to Weaver Nut‟s vendors regarding whether the policy was in place.  
On March 26, 2003, Weaver sought legal advice from defendant Barley, Snyder, 
Senft & Cohen, LLC (“Barley Snyder”). Weaver told Barley Snyder about the 
Agreement, but when Weaver and his wife met with Barley Snyder on April 1, 2003, he 
“falsely advised [the Barley Snyder attorney] that Mr. Reis and Mr. Katz were not 
shareholders in the Company and that the stock warrants mentioned in the development 
agreement had not been exercised by them.” (Id. at 60.) Barley Snyder asked Weaver 
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Nut‟s corporate counsel for the company‟s “corporate records,” but counsel did not have 
them. (Id. at 60-61.) Weaver Nut and Barley Snyder could not find the “corporate 
records” because Reis took them from the company and, without telling Weaver, placed 
them in a safe deposit box; the documents in the safe deposit box included Weaver Nut‟s 
original share certificates. 
Weaver consulted with Barley Snyder about terminating the Agreement and ending 
Weaver Nut‟s relationship with Reis and Katz, and Barley Snyder told Weaver that this 
“was an aggressive strategy which might lead to litigation.” (Id. at 61.) Weaver 
nonetheless decided to move ahead and “end [Weaver Nut‟s] relationship with Messrs. 
Reis and Katz.” (Id.) The partner at Barley Snyder who represented Weaver Nut, Weaver, 
and Miriam Weaver “reasonably believed that Barley Snyder was able to provide 
competent and diligent representation [to these three parties] at the same time because 
their interests were not adverse to one another, based upon Mr. Weaver‟s false 
representations that Messrs. Reis and Katz were not shareholders.” (Id.)  
Taking direction from Weaver as the President and sole director of Weaver Nut, 
and without consulting with Reis or Katz, Barley Snyder sent a letter to Reis and Katz on 
April 11, 2003, advising them that Weaver Nut was terminating the Agreement and “their 
employment with Weaver Nut Company.” (Id. at 62.) Four days later, on April 15, 2003, 
Reis and Katz told Barley Snyder that they collectively owned half of the shares in 
Weaver Nut. Weaver denied this, and Barley Snyder recognized that ownership was in 
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dispute but could not independently investigate this issue “[b]ecause the corporate books 
and records were missing.” (Id.) That same day, the parties met and agreed to hire an 
independent accountant “to take a look at the financial condition of the Company and to 
make recommendations.” (Id. at 63.) The accountant identified a number of problems and 
recommended, among other things, replacing the financing that Reis and Katz helped 
Weaver Nut secure. He also “found numerous deficiencies” in parts of Weaver Nut‟s 
operation that were under Reis‟s supervision and “concluded that Weaver Nut Company 
was better off without the [Agreement] or the employment of Mr. Reis, Mr. Katz or the 
[other employees that Weaver fired around the same time].” (Id. at 65.)  
Weaver and Weaver Nut then sued Reis, Katz, and Summit, and Reis, Katz, and 
Summit brought a shareholder derivative action against Weaver Nut and the Weavers. At 
that point, Barley Snyder informed Weaver Nut that it could no longer represent the 
Weavers and Weaver Nut due to the potential conflict of interest. Barley Snyder 
continued to represent the Weavers individually, but Weaver Nut retained other counsel. 
All litigation among Weaver Nut, the Weavers, Reis, and Katz was settled in December 
of 2003, and as part of the settlement agreement Weaver Nut assigned any claims it had 
against Barley Snyder to Reis and Katz.
2
 The District Court concluded that Weaver 
breached the fiduciary duties that he owed to Reis, Katz, and Weaver Nut. The Court also 
                                                 
2
 The District Court wrote that “Weaver Nut Company assigned to Mr. Reis and 
Mr. Katz any claims the Company might have against Weaver Nut Company,” (R. at 70.), 
but this clearly was a proofreading error. Reis and Katz released their claims against 
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found, however, that Barley Snyder did not know that Weaver “was breaching fiduciary 
duties to either the Company or to Messrs. Reis and Katz.” (Id. at 69.)  
After Reis and Katz were out of the picture, Weaver Nut hired a new CFO and 
obtained new financing that was less expensive than that which Reis and Katz had 
negotiated. Weaver Nut also saved money by cutting staff. The District Court concluded 
that “[t]he increases in operating costs implemented by Messrs. Reis and Katz offset the 
increase in gross profit margin that the Company enjoyed during their tenure” and that 
Weaver Nut “significantly decreased its operating costs” after Reis and Katz were no 
longer involved. (Id. at 68.) Even though sales fell, Weaver Nut “was more profitable in 
2004, 2005 and 2006 than it had been in 2001-2003.” (Id. at 69.) The defense expert, who 
testified that the firing of Katz and Reis caused no damages to Weaver Nut, was “credible 
and persuasive” while Katz‟s lay testimony regarding damages to Weaver Nut was “self-
serving and unconvincing.” (Id. at 79-80.) The Court ultimately “conclude[d] that there 
was no failure to act by Barley Snyder that was a factor in bringing about any damage to 
Weaver Nut Company and that the Company suffered no actual damages.” (Id. at 78.) 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1367, and 
we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reis and Katz brought claims against 
Barley Snyder individually (the “individual claims”) and on behalf of Weaver Nut as its 
                                                                                                                                                             
Weaver Nut, and Weaver Nut assigned to Reis and Katz any claims that it had against 
Barley Snyder. (Id. at 199-200.) 
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assignees. The Court dismissed all but one of the individual claims, and we exercise 
plenary review over that decision. After a bench trial, the Court granted judgment in favor 
of Barley Snyder on all remaining claims. As to the claims that went to trial, we exercise 
plenary review over the Court‟s legal conclusions and review factual findings for clear 
error. We review the Court‟s rulings regarding admission of evidence for abuse of 
discretion. 
III. ANALYSIS 
 A. Motion to Dismiss 
 The District Court granted Barley Snyder‟s motion to dismiss five of the individual 
claims primarily because it predicted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would hold 
that Reis‟s and Katz‟s release of their claims against the Weavers and Weaver Nut also 
released their agent, Barley Snyder, notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary in the 
release. After plaintiffs filed this appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
came to the opposite conclusion and held that “[i]n the scenario entailing a plaintiff's 
surrender of vicarious liability claims only and express preservation of claims against an 
agent, we hold that the parties to a settlement should be afforded latitude to effectuate 
their express intentions.” Maloney v. Valley Med. Facilities, Inc., 984 A.2d 478, 487 (Pa. 
2009). The Court in Maloney specifically disapproved the opinion on which the District 
Court most directly relied, Pallante v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 629 A.2d 146 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  
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Plaintiffs contend that we should reverse and remand the five dismissed individual 
claims for trial. We will affirm the dismissal of two of the individual claims on alternative 
grounds found by the District Court, affirm the dismissal of one claim on an alternative 
ground that was presented to the Court, and reverse the Court on two of the individual 
claims and remand them for further proceedings. 
  1. Professional Negligence and Conversion 
 The District Court dismissed the individual claims for professional negligence and 
conversion on alternative grounds that plaintiffs acknowledged but did not address in 
their initial brief on appeal. The Court clearly stated those grounds, and plaintiffs waived 
any objection to them by failing to address them in their opening brief.
3
 See F.D.I.C. v. 
Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169 (3d Cir. 2000). We, thus, will affirm the Court‟s dismissal of 
these claims. 
  2. Abuse of Process 
 The parties do not dispute that the elements of an abuse of process claim in 
Pennsylvania are that the defendant “(1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) 
primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed[,] and (3) harm 
has been caused to the plaintiff.” Rosen v. Am. Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1993). There is also no dispute that abuse of process is “concerned with a 
perversion of a process after it is issued,” while “[m]alicious use of civil process has to do 
                                                 
3
 We, therefore, will not discuss the arguments that plaintiffs made for the first 
time in their reply brief. 
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with the wrongful initiation of such process.” McGee v. Feege, 535 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Pa. 
1987) (emphasis added). The plaintiffs assert a claim for abuse of process, but they did 
not allege any facts that could support a conclusion that Barley Snyder engaged in “a 
perversion of a process” after it filed the action at issue. We will therefore affirm the 
District Court‟s dismissal of the claim for abuse of process. 
  3. Plaintiffs’ Other Dismissed Individual Claims 
 The District Court dismissed plaintiffs‟ individual claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty and tortious interference with contractual relations (“tortious interference”) solely on 
the basis of what turned out to be its erroneous prediction of Pennsylvania law. Barley 
Snyder contends that the Court‟s factual findings after the bench trial preclude plaintiffs 
from recovering on these individual claims. Plaintiffs respond that this approach is 
improper because the “trial court‟s trial findings [were] on different counts against a 
different plaintiff.” (Appellants‟ Reply Br. at 5.) They argue that we should apply the 
standard for a motion to dismiss and look only to the factual allegations they made in the 
amended complaint. 
 Neither side addresses the question of whether the District Court‟s factual findings 
as to Weaver Nut‟s claims should bind Reis and Katz and preclude them from pursuing 
their individual claims. Even a non-party may be “bound by the determination of issues” 
if he or she “controls or substantially participates in the control of the presentation on 
behalf of a party.” Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 195 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal 
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quotation marks omitted); see also Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798-99 
(1996). This is a factual inquiry, and the Court is in a better position than we are to 
address it in the first instance. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Lansdale Finishers, 
Inc., 484 F.2d 1037, 1038 (3d Cir. 1973). We will therefore reverse the dismissal of the 
individual claims for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference, and will remand 
this case for an analysis of the preclusion issues and, if necessary, further proceedings on 
these two individual claims. 
 B. Post-Trial Judgment 
  1. Damages to Weaver Nut 
 As to the claims that went to trial, we will first review the District Court‟s factual 
finding that Barley Snyder did not cause damages to Weaver Nut. The Court granted 
judgment in favor of defendant on Weaver Nut‟s claims for breach of fiduciary duty, 
professional negligence, tortious interference, and breach of contract because, inter alia, 
Barley Snyder caused no damages to Weaver Nut. Plaintiffs do not challenge the Court‟s 
legal conclusion that Weaver Nut must show damages to succeed on each of these four 
claims, but they contend that the Court erred in its factual finding that Weaver Nut 
suffered no damages attributable to Barley Snyder. 
Plaintiffs have not shown that the District Court committed clear error on this 
issue, and we will affirm the judgment in favor of Barley Snyder on Weaver Nut‟s claims 
for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, tortious interference, and breach of 
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contract.
4
  
  2. Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
 For plaintiffs to succeed on their claims that Barley Snyder aided and abetted 
Weaver‟s breach of fiduciary duty under either Pennsylvania or New Jersey law, they 
must show that Barley Snyder knew that Weaver was breaching his fiduciary duty to 
Weaver Nut, Reis, and Katz. Koken v. Steinberg, 825 A.2d 723, 731 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2003); Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 134 A.2d 761, 767 (N.J. 1957), cited in State 
ex rel. McCormac v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 904 A.2d 775, 782 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2006). Plaintiffs argue that Barley Snyder should have known about the 
shareholder relationship and Weaver‟s breach, and that Barley Snyder was negligent in 
not conducting an independent investigation into the ownership of Weaver Nut. They 
have not, however, carried their burden of showing that the District Court committed 
clear error in finding that Barley Snyder did not actually know about Weaver‟s breach, 
and we will affirm the Court‟s judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs‟ claims – 
individually, and as Weaver Nut‟s assignees – for aiding and abetting.  
                                                 
4
 Because we will affirm the dismissal of the professional negligence claim due to 
the lack of damages to Weaver Nut, we need not address plaintiffs‟ claim that the District 
Court erred in applying the law of Pennsylvania, rather than New Jersey, and in finding 
that there was no joint venture. 
The only individual claim that went to trial was that for aiding and abetting, which, 
as discussed below, we will affirm on other grounds. We will not address plaintiffs‟ 
arguments that the District Court erred in finding that Reis and Katz individually suffered 
no damages. 
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  3. Preclusion of Testimony Regarding Other Conflicts of Interest 
 Plaintiffs challenge the District Court‟s decision to preclude testimony as to Barley 
Snyder‟s alleged conflict of interest regarding its representation of two other companies 
during the time that it represented Weaver Nut. The Court precluded this testimony 
because plaintiffs “[did] not have expert testimony to establish such a conflict,” and the 
issues were complex enough to require expert testimony. (R. at 128, 137-38.) Plaintiffs 
argue that this evidence was relevant and should have been admitted, but they do not 
address the grounds for the Court‟s ruling or show that the Court abused its discretion in 
barring this evidence due to the lack of expert testimony. We will affirm the Court as to 
this issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 We will reverse the District Court as to the individual claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty and tortious interference, and will remand those claims for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. We will affirm the Court in all other respects. 
 
 
